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Abstract—With the explosive growth of indoor data traffic in 
forthcoming fifth generation cellular networks (5G), it is 
imperative for mobile network operators to improve network 
coverage and capacity. Femtocells are widely recognized as a 
promising technology to address these demands. As Femtocells are 
sold or loaned by a mobile network operator (MNO) to its 
residential or enterprise customers, MNOs usually employ 
refunding scheme to compensate the femtocell holders (FHs) 
providing indoor access to other subscribers by configuring the 
femtocell to operate in open or hybrid access mode. Due to the 
selfishness nature, competition between network operators as well 
as femtocell holders makes it challenging for operators to select 
appropriate FHs for trading access resources. This inspires us to 
develop an effective refunding framework, with aim to improve 
overall network resource utilization, through promoting FHs to 
make reasonable access permission for well-matched macro users. 
In this paper, we develop a two-stage auction-Stackelberg game 
(ASGF) framework for access permission in femtocell networks, 
where MNO and mobile virtual network operator (MVNO) lease 
access resources from multiple FHs. We first design an auction 
mechanism to determine the winner femtocell that fulfils the 
access request of macro users. We next formulate the access 
permission problem between the winner femtocell and operators 
as a Stackelberg game, and theoretically prove the existence of 
unique equilibrium. As a higher system payoff can be gained by 
improving individual players’ payoff in the game, each player can 
choose the best response to others’ action by implementing access 
permission, while avoiding solving a complicated optimization 
problem. Numerical results validate the effectiveness of our 
proposed ASGF based refunding framework and the overall 
network efficiency can be improved significantly. 
 
Index Terms—Femtocell, Mobile Network Operator, Mobile 
Virtual Network Operator, Access Permission, Auction, 
Stackelberg Game. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The explosive mobile traffic poses an enormous challenge to 
the next generation mobile communication system (5G) in 
recent years [1]. It is also challenging for mobile cellular 
networks to provide efficient high-speed indoor data 
transmissions due to precious radio resources and poor 
coverage in some typical technical scenarios of 5G [2], which 
may lead to poor user quality of experience (QoE) and affect 
the income of mobile network operators (MNOs). Recently, 
small cell technology including microcell, picocell and 
femtocell, has been explored as a cost-efficient solution to 
improve indoor coverage and data rate. On the other hand, 
mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) have been 
emerging to enhance network resource utilization by 
wholesaling spare resource of MNOs to provide wireless access 
service. Being short of network infrastructure, MVNOs should 
prefer employing small cells to acquire network resources 
rather than only wholesaling [3][4]. 
Compared with other small cells, femtocell is more 
preferable to MNOs and MVNOs because of the low power 
consumption and easy-configuration [5]. Femtocell holders 
(FHs), who can be individual users or network operators, may 
place femtocell anywhere and configure the operation mode 
arbitrarily. Femtocell has three operation modes including open 
access, closed access and hybrid access [6]. In order to 
exclusively utilize femtocell, FHs usually prefer closed mode. 
Hence, it is necessary for MNOs and MVNOs who want to 
exploit the access resource of femtocells, to make economic 
strategy to motivate FHs to adopt hybrid mode. 
Existing research work has proved that auction mechanism 
and game theory are efficient tools to address the competition-
oriented femtocell access permission problem. The authors of 
[7] consider the trade of access time between femtocells and 
mobile user equipments (MUEs), and propose a Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction based incentive framework for 
single macro user and multiple macro users separately to access 
femtocells. However, in real markets, MUEs usually prefer 
authorizing their served network operators rather than 
themselves to make trades with femtocells. This is also helpful 
to simplify the bipartite matching problem in multiple MUEs 
access through operators implementing auction as the number 
of operators is much less than that of MUEs. The authors of [8] 
develop a reverse auction framework to motivate access 
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 permission trading of femtocells in network operator’s 
perspective. In order to avoid much time-consuming problem 
in VCG auction, the authors further propose a suboptimal 
mechanism by allowing range outcome in auction. However, 
the truthfulness of this modified auction is not proved strictly, 
and the participating agent is able to cheat. Hence, the authors 
of [9] propose a utility-aware refunding framework to solve 
access trading between wireless service provider (WSP) and 
FHs in hybrid access femtocell network based on time division 
multiple address (TDMA) system. They formulate the problem 
as a Stackelberg game, and prove the existence of unique Nash 
Equilibrium by analyzing the optimal strategies of both WSP 
and FHs. However, there are some defects in their work. First, 
in access service market, there could be multiple network 
operators competing for access resources of femtocells. Thus 
addressing the scenario of multiple network operators is more 
meaningful. Second, the refunding policy of network operators 
can be distinct with each other by taking into account the 
objective CAPEX (capital expenditure) and OPEX (operating 
expenditure) in addition to user churn rate that is the only factor 
considered in [9]. The work in [10] [11] just analyzes the 
economic effect of deploying and sharing femtocells by 
network operators, and gives the cost expression. 
In this paper, we are focused on the competition of access 
resources between multiple network operators, which 
intervenes FHs in making access permission. Specifically, we 
consider a pair of typical competitors, i.e. MNO and MVNO, in 
our system model. MNO and MVNO usually pay refunds to 
FHs in exchange for access resources, and the amount of 
refunds affects the availability of resources. Obviously, once 
MNO and MVNO fall into irrational competition, FHs probably 
admit excessive users who could be unqualified to be served, 
and thus system performance would be degraded. Under this 
circumstance, it is imperative to develop an effective 
mechanism to motivate every participant to make reasonable 
decision in the access permission game. This is essential to 
retain network operation stability while improving network 
resource utilization. Due to the nature of the access permission 
problem in femtocell network, double-auction mechanism is an 
effective tool for solving it. Unfortunately, double auctions are 
notoriously hard to design and implement in our considered 
scenario [12]. Furthermore, the high computational complexity 
also makes double-auction mechanism difficult to apply [13].  
In order to address the high computational complexity in 
double-auction design for the access permission, we propose a 
two-stage auction-Stackelberg game (ASGF) framework. We 
first use reverse auction model to select the winner femtocells 
that are able to provide reliable access service. Then, we 
formulate the access permission problem between single winner 
femtocell holder (FH) and operators as a Stackelberg game, in 
which MNO and MVNO are leaders, and the winner FH is the 
follower. We prove the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium 
of formulated Stackelberg game. When the equilibrium is 
reached, the access resources are appropriately allocated as 
every participant is satisfied with the allocation scheme to 
maximize their own utility. Meanwhile, due to the uniqueness 
of equilibrium, every participant is qualified to select unique 
appropriate strategy from the set of strategies, and is unwilling 
to change the strategy unless others change, leading to stable 
access resource utilization and thus overall network efficiency.  
 In the first stage of the framework, we use greedy algorithm 
to determine the winner with polynomial time complexity, 
which guarantees the truthfulness of auction as well. In the 
second stage of the framework, due to the existence and 
uniqueness of equilibrium of Stackelberg game, every 
participant can reach their unique appropriate strategy in two 
steps. We suggest a practical algorithm to implement the ASGF 
framework based access permission, in which every participant 
collects some system parameters, such as Signal to Interference 
plus Noise Ratio (SINR) and equivalent revenue on unit data 
rate from users, to determine their strategies through solving the 
equilibrium. We conduct simulation experiments to evaluate 
the proposed ASGF framework. Numerical results show that 
every participant can maximize their own utility, and the overall 
network efficiency is improved significantly as well. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, 
we describe system model. In Section III, we give the definition 
of refunding strategy function (RSF) and price-coefficient, and 
formulate the access permission problem. In Section IV, we 
employ iterative two-stage auction-Stackelberg game 
framework for access permission in femtocell networks and 
prove the existence of unique Nash Equilibrium for the 
Stackelberg game. We present the implementation of our 
proposed two-stage auction-Stackelberg game based access 
permission scheme in Section V. Section VI presents the 
numerical results and discussions. We review the related work 
in Section VII and finally conclude the paper in Section VIII. 
II. SYSTEM MODEL 
In this paper, we consider a femtocell network, where MNO 
and MVNO employ refunding policy to compensate the FHs to 
provide indoor access service for their users. We present the 
network model and refunding model respectively in this 
section. 
A. Network model 
In the femtocell network shown in Fig.1(a), there are some 
femto access points (FAPs) that are configured to operate in 
hybrid access mode by the femtocell holders (FHs). The FHs 
authorize subscribed user equipments (SUEs) to access FAPs.  
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(b) Access permission of single winner FAP 
Fig. 1 Illustration of femtocell network and access scenario 
Without loss of generality, we assume that the access 
resources of each FAP are divided into resource blocks that can 
be allocated to users for access as shown in Fig.1(b). For single 
FAP, let us denote by p  the number of served SUEs, and by 
i  the allocated fraction of total resources to the ith SUE. The 
aggregated fractions of access resources for served SUEs can 
be expressed as 
1
p
i pi
 
=
= . In order to attain higher SINR, 
macrocell UEs of MNO (T-MUEs) and macrocell UE of 
MVNO (V-MUEs) may move into a femtocell. MNO and 
MVNO are willing to pay refunds for access resources of FAP 
to their users. If having spare resources, FH may control FAP 
to admit additional T-MUEs and V-MUEs. The aggregated 
fractions of access resources for served T-MUEs and served V-
MUEs can also be expressed as 
1
m
i mi
 
=
=  and 
1
n
i ni
 
=
=  respectively, where m   and n   denote the 
number of T-MUEs and V-MUEs respectively, and i   and i   
represent the allocated fraction of total resource blocks to ith T-
MUE and ith V-MUE respectively. As all the access resources 
are allocated to the admitted users, we have 1p m n  + + = . 
Furthermore, we assume that femtocells access the same 
frequency band as the macrocell, and different femtocell may 
reuse the same spectrum. The interference of femtocell can be 
introduced by macrocell and neighboring femtocells. We use 
( )totI X  to denote the total interference power introduced by 
neighboring femtocells, and 
M ( )I D  to denote the interference 
power introduced by macrocell which share the same spectrum 
with femtocells. We consider ( )totI X  is a function of the 
number of neighboring femto cells X , and 
M ( )I D  is a function 
of the distance between studied femtocell and macrocell. Hence 
the SINR of a UE is given by 
2
M( ) ( )
r
i i
tot
P
Sd h
N I X I D
 −
 
=  
+ + 
           (1) 
where P  is the transmit power of FAP, N  is the Gaussian 
noise, S  is the log-normal shadowing component, id  is the 
distance between ith UE and FAP, r  is the path fading 
exponent, h  is the Rayleigh-distributed fading magnitude 
satisfying ( )2 1E h = .  
Without loss of generality, we normalize the channel 
bandwidth, and then the capacity of the ith UE is given by 
2log (1 )i iC = + ,                             (2) 
We assume that each type of served UE such as SUE, T-
MUE and V-MUE, require specific targeted SINR when they 
access FAP. Hence, we define a threshold of SINR as the basic 
service quality. Denote by F , M  and V  the SINR threshold 
for SUEs, T-MUEs, and V-MUEs respectively. Therefore, the 
total data rate of each type of UEs, which is denoted by  , can 
be given respectively by:      
2log (1 )FH p F  = + ,                       (3) 
    2log (1 )MNO m M  = +  ,                     (4) 
2log (1 )MVNO n V  = + .                      (5) 
B. Refunding model 
With strong wish to improve indoor transmission data rate, 
network operators are naturally willing to trade the money 
directly for spare resources of femtocell as long as the higher 
indoor rate brings more income. An FH is likely to get extra 
revenues from operators to compensate the investment on 
equipment in case of bringing no apparent performance 
degradation to the communication service for the subscribers. 
Obviously, it is a win-win situation for operators and FHs to 
adopt the trade that is indeed a refunding scheme. In the 
refunding, operators first consider the benefits from the trade. 
If the income from indoor UEs is larger than the refunds 
compensated to the FH, operators start to refund, vice versa. We 
define the utility function of operators as: 
2log (1 )MNO M m M MNOU R  = + − ,                  (6) 
2log (1 )MVNO V n V MVNOU R  = + − ,                  (7) 
where M  denotes the equivalent revenue the MNO receives 
on unit data rate from the T-MUEs admitted by FAP; V   
denotes the equivalent revenue the MVNO receives on unit data 
rate from the V-MUEs admitted by FAP; MNOR  denotes the 
refunds that the MNO pays to FH; MVNOR  denotes the refunds 
that the MVNO pays to FH. 
Similarly, we define the utility function of FH as: 
2log (1 )FH F p F MNO MVNOU R R  = + + + ,           (8) 
which includes three parts: the first part represents the income 
from innate FAP service, where F  denotes the equivalent 
revenue the FH receives on unit data rate from SUEs. The rest 
two parts represent the refunds gained from MNO and MVNO 
respectively. 
 III. PROBLEM FORMULATION 
 In this section, we first define a refunding strategy function 
(RSF) to describe the relationship between refunding amount 
and corresponding attained resources. We also propose the 
price-coefficient to reflect the strategy space for network 
operators, followed by the formulation of access permission 
problem. 
A. Problem description 
Due to selfishness nature, both MNO and MVNO may 
pursue utility maximization by paying refunds in exchange for 
indoor access resources. Meanwhile, they are supposed to offer 
appropriate amount of refunds in a rational way when knowing 
no information about opponent’s strategy. A reasonable 
approach of designing refunding strategy is to take into account 
some relevant factors. For instance, when an operator 
determines the amount of refunds to an FH, he may investigate 
whether the femtocell is worthy of accessing, how many data 
rates it can provide, and how much profits it can make from 
admitted users. Similarly, the FH faces the following dilemma. 
On the other hand, he may also worry about the negative 
influence on the network performance if sharing resources only 
to the one who offers higher refunds, as he cannot ensure that 
the communicate service will not be degraded if end users are 
admitted only according to their refunds. For example, when 
some users acquire access resources, the channel capacity and 
data rate of femtocell may be substantially decreased. This 
certainly leads to dissatisfaction of authorized users of the 
femtocell. Therefore, femtocell access permission is indeed the 
access resource allocation, in which FHs allocate appropriate 
access resources to requesting users according to channel 
conditions and the amount of refunds provided by MNO and 
MVNO. In order to maximize own utility, every participant 
should employ reasonable strategy. 
B. Refunding strategy function and price-coefficient 
In general, when network operators pay refunds to FHs for 
user access, they always make decision while complying with 
some laws on technology and market. For instance, at the 
beginning of refunding, operators are positive to trade access 
resources by using large amount of refunds if they have 
sufficient capital. However, with the growth of the number of 
admitted users, FAP may provide poor indoor access for new 
requesting users. This may lead to decrease on the benefits if 
operators continue employing high refunds. In this case, it could 
be more reasonable for the operators to mount femtocell by 
themselves instead of leasing resources form the FH. Hence, 
operators may decrease the refunding amount when the FAP 
have permitted certain number of UEs. Based on this 
observation, we propose a refunding strategy function (RSF) of 
operators as: 
( )log 1R B x= +  ，                           (9) 
where B  represents the refund base satisfying 
B Income Investment= − , in which Income  denotes the 
earnings of the operator from total business such as ADSL, 
cellular and other services; Investment  denotes the 
fundamental expenditure of the operators for infrastructure or 
operation. Obviously, B  is an indicator to reflect the capital 
quantity of the operator. x  represents the fraction of access 
resources allocated to an operator.   denotes the price-
coefficient, which indicates the refunding strategy of operators. 
The RSF actually reflects the trend of refunding amount versus 
the number of admitted UEs in network operator’s perspective. 
Considering the value of this function is non-negative and 
increasing, we have 0B  , 1  , and 0 1x  . 
However, in our system model, competition for access 
resources exists between MNO and MVNO.  Although the 
refund base and allocated access resource can be the same, 
MNO and MVNO are still capable of adopting different 
strategy dynamically by changing the amount of refunds. For 
instance, as being lack in infrastructure and customer base, 
MVNO could be more aggressive than MNO to hunt for the 
same amount of resources, and thus the refunds provided by 
MVNO could be larger. Yet, coming with the growth of 
attained resources, MVNO is hard to support the high refunds 
with financial deficiency. Thus the MVNO has to adjust the 
strategy and pays less refunds. Based on these considerations, 
we design price-coefficient as refunding strategy form of 
operators. The network operators change the value of price-
coefficient in RSF to determine certain refunding amount. 
Therefore, we have the refunding amount of MNO and MVNO 
respectively as 
( )log 1
MMNO M m
R B  = + ,                   (10) 
( )log 1
VMVNO V n
R B  = + ,                   (11) 
where MB  and VB  denote the refund base of MNO and MVNO 
respectively; M  and V  denote the price-coefficient of MNO 
and MVNO respectively.
 
C. Utility maximization 
As mentioned before, both MNO and MVNO are willing to 
pay refunds to the FH on the basis of obtaining benefits from 
indoor data rate improvement. From the financial perspective, 
the utility of network operators consists of two parts: one is the 
income contributed by providing indoor data service to the 
admitted UEs in FAP, and the other is the expense as funds paid 
to FH. For the selfishness and rationality, operators are 
delighted to maximize their own utility, which depends on some 
factors, such as the equivalent revenue on unit data rate, the 
fraction of resources allocated by FH, the price-coefficient. 
Therefore, we formulate the utility maximization problem for 
MNO and MVNO respectively as follows: 
( ) ( )2max max log 1 log 1M
M M
MNO M m M M mU B 
 
    = + − + 
(12) 
 ( ) ( )2max max log 1 log 1V
V V
MVNO V n V V nU B 
 
    = + − + 
(13)
 
 It is clear that M  and V  are critical to maximize the 
utility, as M  and V  determine the refunding amount directly 
and affect the allocated resource fraction as well. Other factors, 
including equivalent revenue on one unit data rate, refund base, 
and SINR threshold, may be considered constant for a time 
period of interest. Furthermore, when operators determine the 
refunding amount, the allocated fractions m  and n  are 
generally known. So we define M  and V  as variable for the 
utility maximization problems (12) and (13). 
On the other hand, the FH receives the refunds and tries to 
make an optimal allocation of access resources. The FH 
partitions the access resources of FAP into three parts with 
ratios of p , m  and n , respectively. As 1p m n  + + = ,  
p  can be represented as 1 m n − − . So, in order to improve 
his utility, the FH may assign appropriate value for m  and n  
to allocate the spare access resources to MNO and MVNO 
according to the refunding amount. Thus we can formulate the 
problem of FH utility maximization as follows:  
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2
, ,
max max 1 log 1
log 1 log 1
m n m n
M V
m n F F
M m V nB B
   
 
   
 
= − − +
+ + + + 
,    (14) 
where m  and n  are variables for the utility maximization 
problem of FH. 
IV. TWO-STAGE AUCTION-STACKELBERG GAME 
FRAMEWORK 
In this section, we propose an iterative two-stage auction-
Stackelberg game framework (ASGF) for access permission in 
femtocell networks. In the first stage, we employ auction 
mechanism to select appropriate FAPs which are capable of 
sharing spare access resources. In the second stage, we 
formulate the access permission of single selected FAP as a 
Stackelberg game, in which MNO and MVNO are the leaders, 
and femtocell holder (FH) is the follower. The details are 
presented as follows. 
A. Auction for selecting the winner FAP 
 In the first stage of ASGF framework, we make use of 
Vickrey-Clarke-Grove (VCG) mechanism based reverse 
auction to select appropriate FAPs to admit macro users. 
Considering the allocated access resources of FAPs can be 
multiple basic resource blocks, the auction is indeed a multi-
unit reverse auction, in which FAPs are bidders, and MNO and 
MVNO are auctioneers. When FAPs participate in the auction, 
they usually intend to adopt rational bid for reasonable payoff, 
and they are not likely to adopt different bid respectively to 
MNO and MVNO. Thus, we assume the bids of FAPs to MNO 
and MVNO are the same.  
  Furthermore, let the number of FAPs in the femtocell 
network be denoted by I . The bid of the ith FAP contains three 
parts, i.e., the valuation of unit resource block iv , the quantity 
of spare access resources of FAP iq , and the coverage area of 
FAP ic . Meanwhile, we assume that the coverage area of 
femtocell network can be partitioned into K  unit areas (or 
locations). If we use coordinate marks to denote different unit 
areas, the coverage can be represented by a vector, in which 
elements is corresponding coordinate mark. Naturally, the 
number of coordinate marks is K . If a FAP covers some 
locations (i.e. coordinate marks), the elements of the vector, are 
set to 1. Therefore, the coverage area of the ith FAP can be 
denoted by  0,0, ,1,
K
i i
c =    
6444447 444448
. Finally, the bid of the ith FAP 
can be denoted by { , ,{0,0, ,1, } }i i i ibid v q=      . Every FAP would 
submit their own bid to MNO and MVNO respectively to trade 
the spare access resources. Fig. 2 shows the reverse VCG 
auction for access resources between FAPs and two network 
operators. 
MNO MVNO
FAP FAP FAPFAPFAPFAP
auctioneer
bidders
  , , 0,0,...1,...i i i ibid v q=
Fig. 2 Illustration of reverse VCG auction for access resources between FAPs 
and two network operators 
a. VCG mechanism 
In multi-unit reverse auction, VCG mechanism is efficient to 
guarantee the maximization of social welfare as well as the 
truthfulness of bid for valuation of goods [16]. Hence, the first 
part of the bid of FAPs (i.e.,
iv ) is equal to the true valuation of 
unit resource block. When MNO and MVNO have received the 
bids of FAPs, they can select appropriate FAPs as winners to 
minimize the expense that is used for satisfying the true 
valuation of unit resource block of FAPs. We can thus 
formulate this problem as follows, 
*
1 1
arg min
I K
ik i
A i k
A q v
= =
 
=  
 
  , s.t. 0i MUEc c  , 
1
K
ik i
k
q q
=
   (15) 
where A  denotes the set of all feasible auction results; *A  
denotes optimal auction results; 
MUEc  denotes the position 
distribution of MUE in the femtocell network; 
ikq  denotes the 
available amount of spare access resources of FAP in k   
coordinate. For consistency, we use the vector of the same 
dimension of 
ic  to represent MUEc , in which the number of 
elements equals to K  basic coordinate marks. Hence, the 
distribution of MUEs can be denoted by ( )1 2, ,...,
K
MUE kc x x x= , 
where 
kx  denotes the number of MUEs in k  coordinate mark. 
The constraint of 0i MUEc c   indicates that the winner FAP 
must covers at least one MUE. 
  According to the properties of VCG auction, we can 
calculate the price directly that network operators ought to pay 
for the ith winner FAP as 
 * *( \ )i j j
j i
p V N i q v

= − ,                        (16) 
where 
1,
( \ ) min
I
j j
j j i
V N i q v
= 
=   represents the new optimal 
auction result to minimize the expense for the bid of FAPs 
except the ith FAP. *j j
j i
q v

  represents the rest expense of *A  
optimal auction result except the ith FAP. 
b. Winner determination algorithm (WDA) 
In order to reduce the complexity of winner determination in 
the reverse auction, we assume that the FAP, which is unique 
in k  coordinate as well as covers at least one MUE, can be 
selected as the winner directly by network operators. If many 
FAPs cover the same coordinate, we can employ greedy 
algorithm to determine the winner FAP in overlapped area. The 
Winner Determination Algorithm (WDA) is presented as 
follow. 
TABLE 1. WDA 
L : the set of FAPs sorted by 
iv  in ascending order; 
for i L   
  if 0i MUEc c   then 
   L' L\ i= ; 
end for 
i
L'
c=H ; 
if 1kH =  then 
*i i=  who covers the k  coordinate 
 L'' L'\ i=  ； 
while 0kx    for each k   and 0L''    do 
( )j next L''=  ; 
  for all k K   do 
    if 0kx    then 
min{ , }jk k jke x q=  ; 
k k jkx x e= −  ; 
*i j= ; 
i*kUpdate( q )   
end if 
  end for 
end while 
In WDA, MNO and MVNO sorts all the FAPs in ascending 
order of their value of unit resource block iv . Then they 
exclude the FAPs which cover no MUE, and determine the FAP 
that has no overlapped coverage with other FAPs as winner. At 
last, MNO and MVNO iteratively check the bid of FAPs in 
overlapped coverage to select their own respective winners by 
satisfying the access request of MUEs as well as minimizing the 
expense for the auction. 
Some FAPs can be selected as the winner by MNO and 
MVNO simultaneously, or by one of them only. Hence, the 
selected winner FAP can perform the access permission in the 
second stage for one network operator only, or both MNO and 
MVNO. The difference lies at the number of leaders in the 
Stackelberg game. In the next subsection, we are focused on the 
analysis of the Stackelberg game with two leaders for access 
permission. We do not analyze the case with one leader due to 
page limit, as the details of the analyses can be referred to [9]. 
B. Stackelberg game for access permission of winner FAP 
We formulate the access permission of winner FAP as a 
Stackelberg game, in which MNO and MVNO are leaders, and 
FH is follower. Obviously, the game consists of two phases: the 
first one is the refunds compensation of MNO and MVNO, and 
the second one is the access resource allocation of the FH. 
Back induction method is classical to solve Stackelberg 
game. In the following, we first derive the optimal strategy of 
follower based on utility maximization. Next, we use the result 
in leaders’ utilities for maximization. We then prove the 
existence of the Nash Equilibrium. 
a. Best response of FH 
The utility of FH is a function of two optimization variables 
m  and n , which represent the strategy of FH in the game, 
denoted by m n,  . When receiving the information of price-
coefficients 
M  and V  from MNO and MVNO, the FH makes 
the best response  * *m n,   to allocate access resources. 
Proposition: Given price-coefficients M  and V , the best 
response of the FH is given by 
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Proof: For simplicity of notation, we define
2log (1 )F F FA  = + , 2log (1 )M M MA  = + , and 
2log (1 )V V VA  = + . Then, FHU can be expressed as 
(1 ) log ( 1) log ( 1)
M Vm n F M m V n
A B B    − − + + + +  . 
The first order partial derivatives of FHU  with respect to m  
and n   respectively are given by  
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The mixed and second order partial derivatives of FHU  with 
respect to m  and n  are respectively given by  
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  .                   (19) 
As operators are willing to pay refunds for access 
resources only for the situation of having positive capital 
 quantity, we have 0MB  , 0VB  . Furthermore, we have 
ln 0M  and ln 0V   as 1M   and 1V  . 
Obviously, 2 2/ 0FH mU     and 
2 2/ 0FH nU    . We 
know that if a function with two variables satisfies the 
condition that the difference between the square of mixed 
derivative and the product of two second order partial 
derivatives is negative while either second order partial 
derivative is negative, the unique maximum of this 
function exists. Hence the following conditions, which 
guarantee the existence of maximum utility, are satisfied: 
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Therefore, the maximization of  FHU  is achieved by solving 
the following equations are derived by the first order partial 
derivatives being equal to 0: 
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Finally, we obtain the solution as: 
 * *, 1, 1
ln ln
VM
m n
F M F V
BB
A A
 
 
 
= − − 
 
.           (22) 
As 0 1m   and 0 1n    according to their 
definitions, the solution has to satisfy the following conditions: 
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Therefore, the constraints for obtaining the best response of 
the FH are given by 
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Proof completes. Moreover, we can clearly see that the best 
response of FH is non-negative and monotonic with 
M  and 
V . 
b. Best response of MNO and MVNO 
As leaders in the game, both MNO and MVNO will try to 
select their strategy to maximize their own utility while taking 
into account the best response of the FH. For given  * *m n,  , 
MNO and MVNO can make their best response 
*
M  and 
*
V   
independently to determine their refunding amount. For the 
similarity of utility maximization for both MNO and MVNO, 
we present the solution procedure for MNO only in the 
following. 
Proposition: Given  * *m n,  , the best response of MNO is 
given by  
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Proof: Substituting the best response of FH into the utility 
function of MNO yields 
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The first and second order derivatives of MNOU  are 
respectively given by  
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In order to obtain the maximum utility of MNO, the second 
order derivative of MNOU   has to be negative. Since ln 0M  , 
0MB  , 0FA  , we transform the proof of 
2 2/ 0MNO MU     
into the proof of inequality as 
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In fact, it is impossible to obtain analytical solution for M   
in (29). Fortunately, we can prove that the inequality in (29) 
stands easily in some value domain. For example, when 
M e = , we can derive a new inequality as  
( )
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Obviously, (30) is feasible in the value domain of MB , MA   
and FA . Thus, 
2 2/ 0MNO MU     is satisfied. Furthermore, 
letting / 0MNO MU   = , we can obtain the solution as the best 
response of MNO as 
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Proof completes. 
Using the similar method, we can obtain the best response of 
 MVNO as 
( )( )/ 1** A AV FV FB A e
V e
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We can see that *
M  and 
*
V  are positive as well as 
monotonic with some parameters such as 
MB , MA   and FA . It 
means that *
M  and 
*
V  are unique for particular parameters.  
Due to the monotonicity between  * *m n,   and  * *M V,  , for 
given  * *M V,  , there would be a unique  * *m n,  . In other 
words, on the basis of positivity, monotonicity and scalability 
of respective best response [12], each player achieves its unique 
maximal own utility and is unwilling to change their strategies 
to decrease the utility. Therefore, the existence and the 
uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium are proved. 
V. IMPLEMENTATION OF ACCESS PERMISSION 
In this section, we describe the implementation of the 
refunding policy for access permission. We present the 
procedure for every participant to select appropriate strategy 
according to Stackelberg game analysis. Every participant can 
achieve his own utility maximization and reach Nash 
Equilibrium in two steps by the procedure. 
A. Information collection 
In order to select appropriate strategy, MNO and MVNO 
have to acquire the information about F , M , V , F , M   
and V . Among these factors, F , M  and V  can be readily 
obtained from historical data analysis as they can keep stable in 
a time period of interest. However, it is difficult for operators 
to obtain F , M  and V , as they are varying in wireless 
networks  and need to be measured. A feasible solution is that 
the FAP collects these parameter values periodically. FAP is 
able to measure the SINR of every UEs in the coverage and 
compute the average value as threshold for each kind of UEs 
(including SUEs, T-MUEs, and V-MUEs). Obviously, FAP 
then sends this information to MNO and MVNO to help them 
make decisions. Once a new access request arrives, the FAP 
would update the values and re-send the information. Internet 
backhaul link between FAP can facilitate this information 
collection. 
As for FH, M  and V  are crucial factors to perform 
appropriate resource allocation. FH receives M  and V  from 
operators. Together with the previous measured F , the 
appropriate access permission can be determined.  Moreover, 
MB  and VB  significantly affect the strategy selection of both 
FH and network operators. As they are relatively static, we can 
simply initialize the value when refunding mechanism begins. 
B. Procedure of access permission 
On basis of collected parameters values, the FH and network 
operators perform the following steps for access permission:  
1) Initialize F , M , V , MB  and VB  when the refunding 
mechanism starts in hybrid access mode.  
2) The FAP measures the SINR of every UE in its coverage 
area, and classify these SINRs according to the affiliation of 
UEs.  
3) The FAP collects different kinds of SINRs and computes the 
average values as thresholds for every types of UEs: F , 
M  and V . If the SINR of UEs is lower than the 
corresponding threshold of the same UE type, these UEs are 
rejected for access. The rest UEs are marked as permitted T-
MUEs and V-MUEs. 
4) The FAP sends M  and V  to MNO and MVNO 
respectively.  
5) MNO and MVNO receive M  and V , and compute M  
and V  respectively. If 
[ 1/(2 ln ) / 1]
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M F MB A e
 − + − +   
and 
[ 1/(2 ln ) / 1]
/ ln V V F
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 − + − +  are satisfied, MNO 
and MVNO feedback M  and V  to FAP. Otherwise, 
MNO and MVNO return 0, which means that MNO and 
MVNO give up the access request. 
The FAP receives M  and V  reported from MNO and 
MVNO, and examines whether 
/2 /M F M FB A B A
Me e   and 
/ 2 /V F V FB A B A
Ve e   are satisfied first. If these conditions are 
satisfied, FAP computes m  and n , and allocates the 
resources to permitted T-MUEs and V-MUEs. 
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS 
In this section, we conduct simulation experiments to 
validate the effectiveness of our proposed scheme on access 
permission of hybrid femtocell networks.  
A. Scenarios and settings 
The simulation scenario and system settings are as follows. 
There are some FAPs that have fixed coverage radius of 100 
meters and transmission power of 33dBm. These FAPs 
constitute a femtocell network. The whole coverage of 
femtocell network can be partitioned into some areas, and these 
areas can be indicated by the related coordinate marks. We set 
the initial value of the number of FAPs is 10I = , and the initial 
value of the number of coordinate marks is K .Some active 
SUEs, T-MUEs and V-MUEs are randomly distributed around 
the FAP. The access demands of SUEs, T-MUEs and V-MUEs 
are random. As SUEs are usually served by FAP with higher 
priority and better service quality, we set the distance (related 
to SINR threshold) from SUEs to FAP to follow Normal 
distribution with mean 60 meters and variance 10. Similarly, 
the distance from T-MUEs or V-MUEs to FAP follows 
Gaussian distribution with mean 80 meters and variance 10. 
Considering the difference on capital quantity between MNO 
and MVNO, the refund base of MNO is set to 15MB =  , and 
the refund base of MVNO is set to 10VB = . Accordingly, as 
each participant of the game may have different equivalent 
 revenue on unit data rate, we set 3F = , 4M =  and 
3.5V = . These parameters of equivalent revenue and refund 
base may vary. 
In addition, we define some more performance metrics:  
1) Utilization of FAPs (Uf): the ratio of winner FAPs (i.e., the 
FAPs that provide access service for MUEs) to the total 
number of FAPs in the femtocell network; 
2) Throughput (T): the sum of allocated access resources of 
permitted MUEs.  
3) Satisfaction for access demand (Sad): the ratio of 
“Throughput” to the sum of access demand from all MUEs. 
It reflects the success rate of access request of MUE.  
4) Total valuation (Vt):  the sum of expenditure that permitted 
MUEs need to pay for the access service of FAPs. This 
indicator reflects the costs of permitted MUE occupying the 
access resource of femtocell network.  
5) Cost per access permission (Cp): the ratio of “total 
valuation” to “throughput”, which reflects the cost of unit 
access resource. 
B. Numerical results 
In the first simulation experiment, we investigate the social 
welfare of our proposed refunding policy, where the social 
welfare is defined as the sum of every participant’s utility in the 
access permission. We compare the proposed refunding policy 
applied to three access modes for femtocells: open, closed, and 
hybrid modes. We set 0m =  and 0n =  for close access 
mode. Considering that the open access mode has random 
allocation scheme, we simulate a typical scenario in which 
SUEs are dominant and occupy 50% of total resources, the rest 
resources are allocated equally to MNO and MVNO, i.e. 
0.25m =  and 0.25n = . In hybrid access, the FAP would 
select appropriate allocation scheme dynamically according to 
real time wireless environment and the announced price-
coefficients from MNO and MVNO. Fig.3 shows the social 
welfare for three access modes. From Fig.3, we can see that the 
social welfare for hybrid access is the highest as the utility of 
every participant is improved compared with that for closed 
access and open access modes. Although selecting a typical 
value for open access mode, FH still prefers adopting hybrid 
access mode in other conditions because of less handover and 
signaling overhead. 
 
Fig.3. Comparison of social welfare 
In the second simulation experiments, we compare ASGF 
with TAIF. Fig.4 shows the performance comparison of ASGF 
and TAIF. We can see that ASGF outperforms TAIF in almost 
all performance metrics, except that ASGF has close Vt 
performance with TAIF. Specifically, ASGF approximately 
achieves 10% higher Uf  and Cp , and 5-8% higher T and Sad  
than TAIF. These results reveal that ASGF can enable more 
FAPs to provide access service for MUE, improve access 
capacity, and increase the success rate of access requests. On 
the other hand, the expenditure paid by MUEs for allocated 
access resource by using ASGF is almost the same as that by 
using TAIF. 
 
(a) Comparison of utilization of FAPs        (b) Comparison of throughput 
 
(c) Comparison of satisfaction for access demand (d) Comparison of total 
valuation 
 
(e) Comparison of cost per access permission 
Fig.4. Performance comparison between ASGF and TAIF 
 
(a) Utilization of FAPs versus I              (b) Throughput versus I                 
  
(c) Satisfaction for access demand versus I    (d) Total valuation versus I    
 
(e) Cost per access permission versus I  
Fig.5. Effectiveness of ASGF and TAIF versus I  
In the third simulation experiments, we investigate the 
impact of the number of FAPs I on the performance of femtocell 
network. Intuitively, the number of FAPs has significant impact 
as it determines the density of femtocell. Fig.5 shows 
performance of ASGF and TAIF as a function of  I. We can see 
that T, Sad and Vt  monotonically increase while  Uf  and Cp 
decrease with I. It indicates that deploying more FAPs enables 
MUEs to pay less expenditure and share more access capacity, 
while the system achieves higher success rate of access 
requests. However, deploying more FAPs may cause that some 
FAPs become idle if there are no sufficient access requests. 
Moreover, ASGF always outperforms TAIF in all metrics. In 
conclusion, the results reveal that increasing the density of 
FAPs in femtocell network can improve network performance, 
and the effect is more significant by utilizing ASGF. 
 
(a) Utilization rate of FAPs versus ,  I K    (b) Throughput versus ,  I K  
 
(c) Satisfaction for access demand versus ,  I K (d) Total valuation versus ,  I K  
 
(e) Cost performance versus ,  I K  
  Fig.6. Impact of parameters ( ,  I K ) to network performance 
In the next simulation experiments, we investigate the impact 
of the number of coordinate marks K  on network performance 
of ASGF. The value of K  can reflect the density of FAPs for 
certain number of FAPs. For example, we assume that there are 
5 FAPs in a femtocell network, and the coverage of the 
femtocell network can be partitioned into 10 unit areas (i.e.,
=10K ). The density of FAPs can be approximately considered 
as 5/10=50%. As both I   and K  can affect the density of 
FAPs, we fix one while varying the other. Fig.6 shows 
performance of ASGF as a function of I  and K  respectively.  
Uf , Sad  and Cp  monotonically increase with K  and decrease 
with I . Intuitionally, for fixed I , increasing the value of K  is 
equivalent to decreasing the density of FAPs, or decreasing the 
number of FAPs for fixed K .  However, in Fig.6 (b) and Fig. 
6 (d) , T and Vt   increase with both K and I. the reason is that 
the “dilution” by fixing I  and increasing K  cannot truly 
decrease the capacity of access service. The increment on 
coverage makes some FAPs to become “hot” in certain areas. 
These hot FAPs would rather open more access resources if 
MUEs pay more refunds. Therefore, the allocated access 
resources of MUEs increase, resulting in the improvement on 
throughput, as shown in Fig.6 (d). However, this improvement 
is less significant than adding FAPs to the femtocell network, 
as the available access resources of hot FAPs is always limited. 
Thus the curve for varying K is below the curve for varying I
. 
 
Fig.7. Allocated resource versus    
Then, we investigate the change of the obtained resources of 
operators when the equivalent revenue on unit data rate of 
 operators varies. Fig. 4 shows both MNO and MVNO can attain 
more spare access resources if they increase the revenue on one 
unit data rate. From Fig.7, we can observe an interesting 
phenomenon. Both curves show that when an operator keeps 
his equivalent revenue unchanged, another operator may obtain 
more access resources than his opponent by increasing the 
equivalent revenue. We also find that once an operator selects 
the same strategy with his opponent, the dominant one may lose 
the advantage, because two curves in Fig.7 roughly overlap. 
Hence, the reasonable way for network operators to obtain more 
resources is providing differentiated services rather than merely 
increasing service price. 
Finally, we investigate the influence of refund base on the 
best response of FH (allocated resources to MNO and MVNO 
respectively), and the best responses of MNO and MVNO (the 
best price-coefficients). Fig.8 shows that the allocated resources 
to operators are not determined by refund base, and the best 
price-coefficient can become larger when refund base of 
operators increase. From Fig.8 (a), we find that FH may not be 
sensitive to the refund base, as the amount of allocated 
resources of MNO and MVNO both keep relatively stable when 
operators increase their refund base. It indicates that the capital 
quantity of MNO and MVNO cannot affect FH to allocate 
access resources. From Fig.8 (b), we find that the best price-
coefficients of both MNO and MVNO increase when operators 
increase their refund base. As the capital quantity of MNO is 
usually larger than that of MVNO, the best price-coefficient of 
MNO is smaller than that of MVNO. It indicates that MNO is 
indeed aggressive and may pay more refunds than MVNO for 
the same amount of resources. 
     
       (a) Allocated resources                     (b) The best price-coefficient 
Fig.8. Allocated resources and price-coefficient versus refund base 
VII. RELATED WORK 
When femtocell technology emerges, most attentions are 
paid on its influence to existing network. Four technical 
challenges are identified in [4], including interference 
coordination, cell association and biasing, mobility and soft 
handover, and self-organizing networks. Later, further studies 
[5]-[7] prove that access control mechanism can affects all 
above four technical challenges. Recent years witness the 
growing body of literatures on the access control of femtocell 
networks [12]-[15].  In [14], Lin Cui and Weijia Jia propose a 
heuristic algorithm for hybrid femtocells to solve mutual 
selection admission (MSA) problem. They consider that users 
prefer to access the femtocells that have the best signal quality 
for better service. Guruacharya et al. in [15] divide the 
transmitters of OFDMA femtocell network into two 
complementary coalitions, depending on whether the 
transmitters connected to femto access points or not. Then, a 
coalition game is formulated, and some stable coalition 
structures are obtained as the solution of access control 
problem. 
As femtocell holders (FHs) are dominant to configure and 
manage their femtocells, more studies start to investigate how 
individual actions affect the access control and network 
performance [16]-[19]. Yanjiao Chen et al. in [8] propose a 
utility-aware refunding framework to motivate FHs to adopt 
hybrid access mode. In the framework, Both FHs and MNO aim 
to maximize their utilities during spectrum allocation. The 
optimal strategies of them are analyzed by formulating a 
Stackelberg game. In [16], Yanjiao Chen et al. also propose a 
reverse auction framework for fair and efficient access 
permission transaction. The devised model allows wireless 
service providers accept partial demand fulfillment. 
Furthermore, the proposed greedy algorithm for winner and 
price determination reduce the computational complexity. Sha 
Hua et al. in [17] propose a Vickrey-Clarke-Grove (VCG) 
auction based incentive framework for hybrid access 
femtocells, and designed two scheme respectively for single 
user access and multiple user access. In [18], Xin Kang et al. 
assume that the macrocell protected itself by pricing the 
interference from femtocell users under spectrum-sharing 
deployment. Then, a Stackelberg game is formulated to analyze 
this problem, and uniform pricing and non-uniform pricing 
schemes is proposed for sparsely deployed scenario and densely 
deployed scenario. Pantisano et al. in [19] suggest a framework 
for macrocell-femtocell cooperation under closed access mode, 
in which each macrocell granted the cooperative relay femtocell 
a fraction of its super frame as return. The author of [19] make 
use of coalitional game to describe whether macrocell and 
femtocell are worthy cooperating while maximizing a utility 
function in terms of throughput and delay. It thus can be seen 
that game theory and some economic thinking have been 
efficient analytical tools to solve the problem of access control 
for femtocell network. 
In addition, other studies are focused on the relationship 
between femtocell and mobile virtual network operators 
(MVNOs), and give some suggestions on efficient spectrum 
utilization of femtocell network in the perspective of MVNOs 
[20]-[22]. These works inspire us to consider the competition 
between MNOs and MVNOs on access control of femtocell 
network. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have investigated the competition between 
MNO and MVNO in the access permission of hybrid femtocell 
network. We have proposed a two-stage auction-Stackelberg 
game (ASGF) framework, which motivates network operators 
and FHs to share the spare access resources of FAPs by 
refunding policy, and guarantees operators and FHs make 
reasonable decisions as well. In the refunding policy, we have 
designed refunding strategy function to describe the 
relationship between the refunding amount and attained 
 resource, and defined price-coefficient to reflect the refunding 
strategy diversity of MNO and MVNO. In the first stage of 
ASGF framework, VCG based reverse auction determined the 
winner FAPs that can be qualified to make access permission 
for macro users. In the second stage of proposed framework, 
with the help of Stackelberg game analysis, we concluded that 
MNO, MVNO and FH can maximize their utility by reaching a 
unique Nash Equilibrium in the access permission. A feasible 
procedure of access permission has been proposed to guide 
every participant to make appropriate strategy by collecting 
necessary information about system. Simulation results have 
illustrated that proposed ASGF framework improves the social 
welfare of network, and every participant achieves the win-win 
situation by appropriate resource allocation. 
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